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It is a great pleasure to be here, and I want to congratulate the
organizers of the conference for what has already proven to be a
very thorough, successful, and comprehensive roundtable. Much of
what I had intended to say has already been covered in some detail.
I thus think the most useful role I can play at this point is to put
my prepared remarks aside and make a few comments in response
to those which have already been made, and to tell you what has
been happening recently with respect to the Genocide and Torture
Conventions.
Let me say at the outset that I do not appear today to present an
Administration position on the question whether the International
Covenants (or other pending conventions) ought to be given priority
after the Torture Convention has received Senate advice and consent
to ratification. The current Administration strongly supports the Tor-
ture Convention and has actively been devoting its efforts to obtaining
the Senate's approval. When the process of obtaining a favorable
report from the Foreign Relations Committee and a favorable vote
from the full Senate is over, and I am hopeful it will be soon, then
the time will come for the Administration to take a position on the
other treaties. It has not yet done so, and consequently my comments
on the issue today are purely personal and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Department of State or the United States Government.
Nonetheless, it is altogether timely to renew the discussion about
ratifying additional human rights treaties. The debate over the five
conventions and covenants submitted by the Carter Administration
occurred a little more than a decade ago and took place against a
different backdrop in terms of human rights and administration
policy. New legislation requiring a human rights component in our
foreign policy had only recently been adopted. The policies reflected
in that legislation were also relatively new and had not yet become
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fully rooted. They have now, and by comparison I do not think that
one can say today that human rights concerns are not an integral
part of American foreign policy. In the State Department they are
institutionalized in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, which coordinates issues on an inter-agency basis and each
year produces for the combined Congressional foreign affairs com-
mittees the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (in
accordance with sections 116(d) and 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended). Those of you who are seriously involved
in human rights issues certainly should have this document on the
shelf. Just the fact that the State Department produces, on an annual
basis, critiques of other countries in terms of human rights practices
and performances is a substantial difference from the situation that
obtained when the discussion over ratifying the treaties first started.
In my own view, the reasons for ratifying human rights treaties
are, if anything, more compelling today than they were a decade
ago. The case was ably made during the 1979 hearings that ratification
was clearly in the national interest, both in terms of our domestic
system of democratic values and in terms of United States foreign
policy.' Concrete evidence of our support for and observance of
human rights remains an important element of our leadership in the
international community. Our continued non-adherence to the major
multilateral human rights treaties prejudices that leadership; it un-
dermines our credibility in international fora; it weakens our ability
to participate in the development of international human rights law
and mechanisms. Not only are we exposed to a charge of double
standards, but our non-participation has an adverse effect on the
actions of other countries, especially those whose commitment to
human rights may not be as strong as ours from the outset.
Our international commitment to human rights and to the rule of
law ought to be even stronger and more visible today than it was
ten years ago. The breath-taking changes that have recently occurred
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union provide an unparalleled
opportunity for the advancement of democratic values and institu-
tions. Fostering renewed respect for human rights, and the effective
implementation of human rights mechanisms domestically as well as
internationally, ought to be at the top of our agenda.
I See Hearings on International Human Rights Treaties before the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Session, on Exec. C, D, E, and F,
95-2 - Four Treaties Relating to Human Rights, November 14, 15, 16, and 19, 1979.
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At the same time, one has to acknowledge the difficult political
situation that surrounds the issue of ratifying human rights treaties
as a domestic matter. Mention has already been made of the problems
which arose historically in connection with the negotiation of the
International Covenants, leading to the so-called Bricker Amendment
and the 1953 Dulles compact. That reticence continues today in some
Senate quarters, and is one reason it took nearly forty years for the
United States to become party to the Genocide Convention. However
"inconceivable" it may seem to some that the United States has not
yet become party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, there are others who do not view its ratification as a positive
step. It is simply a fact that there are strong feelings in the Senate
about legislating on domestic matters by treaty, about the scope of
the treaty power and its effect on federal-state relationships, and-
even today-about whether human rights are a proper object for the
exercise of the treaty power.
Some have described this aversion to ratifying human rights treaties
as "hypocritical paranoia" and "know nothing arrogance." In my
judgment, such labels misapprehend the nature of the opposition and
do not meaningfully advance the discussion of the serious underlying
issues. Personally, I agree with those who find no constitutional
objections to ratification of human rights treaties in general. And I
think the reluctance to join the multilateral human rights mechanisms
reflects a certain parochialism when it comes to international law,
an unfortunate disinclination to subject our system to international
scrutiny or to open it to the benefits of other systems. But the fact
remains that, as a practical matter, one must deal with Senator
Bricker's legacy in this area. The issues are not of first impression
and are not analyzed solely on the merits or demerits of the particular
treaty provisions.
Let me amplify the point with some additional information about
the Genocide Convention. It has already been noted that one result
of the Bricker controversy in the late 1940's and early 1950's was
that negotiation of the Covenants went ahead without United States
participation; consequently, United States ratification of the Cove-
nants has become problematic. It has also been pointed out, I believe
properly, that obtaining advice and consent to ratification of the
1948 Genocide Convention was a necessary political prerequisite to
proceeding with any other of the human rights treaties. As you know,
advice and consent was finally given in 1986, subject to two reser-
vations, five understandings and one declaration-most of which were
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necessary to obtain the agreement of those Senators of the Bricker
persuasion.
The sole declaration contained an undertaking not to deposit the
instrument of ratification until after the implementing legislation
referred to in Article V of the Convention had been adopted. This,
of course, responded to the concern that treaties should not become
law directly but should only have effect through a specific act of
Congress. The necessary legislation was in fact approved in 19882
and the instrument was adopted, so that the Convention is in force
for the United States. The understandings concerned various defi-
nitional matters, the pledge to grant extradition, and the international
penal tribunal referred to in Article IV.
For present purposes, the reservations are the more important. The
first reservation concerned the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) under Article IX of the Convention and stated that
the specific consent of the United States is required in each case
before a dispute can be submitted to the Court. The second reser-
vation, the "sovereignty" or "son of Bricker" reservation, provided
that "nothing in this Convention requires or authorizes legislation
or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States."
Since United States ratification, both reservations have been the
subject of objections filed with the United Nations depositary by a
number of countries, primarily our Western European allies. This is
a fairly recent development, the implications of which we are still
considering. First, with respect to the ICJ reservation, some countries
have consistently been unable to accept reservations of this nature;
this is a well-known point of difference between our governments.
As you may know, United States policy toward the Court at the
moment is not to accept compulsory jurisdiction. Indeed, in the
context of treaty negotiations, we always have to strive for a provision
in the treaty itself which permits us to "opt out" of the Court's
jurisdiction. Provisions like that are found in a number of recent
multilateral conventions. A number of countries are not happy about
it, and some on the Hill are not happy about it, but it is our policy.
Most significantly, countries have objected to the second reservation
on the grounds that it creates uncertainty over the extent of the
obligations which the United States is prepared to assume under the
2 See Pub. L. 100-606, Nov. 4, 1988, 102 Stat. 3045, the Genocide Convention
Implementation Act of 1987.
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Convention. Their basic contention is that it is impossible for other
countries to know whether any provision in the Convention in fact
requires unconstitutional legislation or other action. Consequently,
they cannot judge the effect of the reservation on United States
obligations under the Convention, nor can they rely on our apparent
acceptance of those obligations if, at some future time, we might
invoke our Constitution to avoid them.
As one previous speaker has said, the reservation itself is in the
nature of a tautology. Nothing in the Convention does or properly
could authorize or require legislation or other action which is un-
constitutional. The point has also been made earlier today that the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land and necessarily binds
the Government; neither a treaty nor an executive agreement can
authorize action inconsistent with it. This was unambiguously estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert.3 However, during
Senate consideration, some concern was expressed over the possibility
that the incitement provision in Article III might infringe on the
exercise of free speech.4 Recognizing explicitly the "no treaty can
override or conflict with the Constitution," 5 the Committee none-
theless felt a "Constitutional reservation" was appropriate given the
"unique" nature of the Convention "in that it touches upon such
fundamental matters as the relationship between criminal law and
the right of free speech."
One might argue that a narrower, more focused reservation ad-
dressed only to the incitement provision itself would have been ad-
equate and more appropriate than the broader, open-ended
"sovereignty reservation" that was in fact adopted and potentially
covers the entire Convention. From the international perspective,
however, the issue is less the breadth of the reservation than the
perception that the United States is claiming the right to invoke its
domestic law to defeat its international obligations. Indeed, a majority
of the states objecting to the reservation did so precisely on this
ground, that a state may not invoke its national law, including its
constitution, to justify its failure to carry out its obligations under
the Convention.
The effect of these objections is important and is the reason why
they are of particular concern. Under contemporary international law,
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
4 See, e.g., Exec. Rep. 99-2, Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
on the Genocide Convention, July 18, 1985, at 19-21.
1 Id. at 20.
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an objection to a reservation to a multilateral treaty does not generally
preclude the treaty relationship between the reserving and objecting
parties, but does eliminate from the relationship those provisions
covered by the objection and reservation. Thus, if the reservation
had been directed specifically to the incitement provision, an objection
would have nullified the treaty relationship only with respect to that
provision. However, the "sovereignty" reservation attaches to the
entire Convention, so that the objections leave the overall extent of
legal obligations under the Convention unclear as between the ob-
jectors and ourselves. Moreover, the "sovereignty" reservation is
available to all other treaty partners on a reciprocal basis, so that
our ability to invoke treaty rights against them would be subject to
invocation of their constitutions and, perhaps, other provisions of
their domestic law. Finally, there is concern that other countries may
follow the United States lead in conditioning their acceptance of the
Convention upon their constitutions or internal law. Beyond signalling
an ambiguous commitment on the part of the United States, it is
argued, the reservation encourages other to hedge their international
undertakings too, thus effectively nullifying the entire object and
purpose of the Convention itself.
The damage, unfortunately, is not limited to the Genocide Con-
vention, since the "sovereignty" provision has subsequently been
attached (as an understanding) to various bilateral mutual legal as-
sistance treaties (or "MLATs") as well as to the recently adopted
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances.6 At the recent hearing on the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Senator Helms indicated his
intent to attach a "sovereignty" reservation to that treaty as well.
Let me turn for a few moments to the current status of the Torture
Convention, since the outcome of Senate consideration of this mul-
tilateral treaty will necessarily affect the decision on which covenants
or conventions are pursued next and how they ought to be approached.
As you know, the United States was actively involved in the nego-
tiation of this Convention, which was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1984. After extensive internal debate, the Reagan
Administration signed and submitted the Torture Convention to the
6 See Exec. Rep. 101-15, Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
on the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Nov. 14, 1989.
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Senate in May, 1988, together with a rather extensive "package" of
proposed reservations, understandings, and declarations modeled to
some extent on the provisos which had been proposed with respect
to the International Covenants and those which had been attached
to the Genocide Convention. That "package" met with substantial
opposition from human rights groups and other interested parties,
both as to its overall length and breadth and with respect to the
specific understandings concerning the definition of torture.
At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the Department agreed to review the original package to
see if we could meet the most substantial criticisms and concerns
voiced on the Hill, by the human rights organizations, and by members
of the bar. As a result of this review, it was decided, in conjunction
with the Departments of Justice and Defense, to make a number of
revisions, to withdraw some of the proposals, and to offer a few
new ones.
I will not take time this afternoon to go into the details, except
to note that the more important changes included (a) accepting par-
ticipation in the Committee Against Torture, as well as the Com-
mittee's competence to consider state-to-state complaints under Art.
21 (but not those brought by individuals under Art. 22), and (b) a
modification to the understanding concerning the definition of torture
specifying that to constitute torture an act must be specifically in-
tended to inflict severe physical or mental pain and suffering, which
we believe does not unduly raise the Convention threshold but at the
same time is precise enough to meet constitutional requirements for
a criminal statute.
We have also upgraded to a reservation the proposed understanding
to Article 16, which would limit our obligation to prevent "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" to the cruel, unusual,
and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The
point is to underscore the possibility of a divergence between our
courts' interpretation of those words as a constitutional matter and
the interpretation that could be given to them by other tribunals, for
example, the European Court of Human Rights in .Strasbourg.
The concern here is not academic but is motivated in part by the
recent decision of that court in the Soering case. 7 As you are probably
7 See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
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aware, Jens Soering was accused of the particularly brutal murder
of his girlfriend's parents in Virginia, evidently acting at the girl-
friend's instigation. Both fled to England, where our law enforcement
authorities located them and requested their extradition. She waived
extradition, returned, pled guilty and received a very substantial
sentence. He, instead, resisted extradition on the grounds that if
convicted he would be subject to the death penalty in Virginia and,
because our system provides for multiple appeals, he faced the pros-
pect of spending many years on death row never quite knowing if
the sentence was going to be carried out or not. While not holding
the death penalty unlawful, the European Court of Human Rights
did find that under the circumstances, in the face of the so-called
"death row syndrome," his extradition to Virginia on capital felony
charges would constitute a violation of his rights under Article 3 of
the European Convention on Human Rights. That article, of course,
concerns inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, substantially
the same formulation found in the Torture Convention.
In light of this decision, it seems appropriate for the United States
to state that we will adhere to Article 16 only to the extent that it
implicates the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. This is, by com-
parison to the "sovereignty reservation," a more limited and precise
approach based on specific concerns that ought not be objectionable
to the international community.
Thus far, the Administration has said that it opposes adoption of
a more general "sovereignty reservation" to the Torture Convention.
The revised package does include a proposed declaration that Articles
1 to 16 of the Convention are not self-executing, a federal-state
reservation, and a reservation to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, together
with a number of more technical understandings concerning the terms
and definitions used in the Convention. In my own view, the revised
package is an improvement, but it is not certain to be accepted by
the Senate.
Finally, let me call your attention to the Verdugo-Urquidez8 decision
handed down last week by the Supreme Court. The decision purports
to limit the extraterritorial application of the Constitution to aliens,
more particularly in the context of the application of the Fourth
Amendment to the search and seizure of an alien's property abroad
I See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S.Ct., 1056 (1990).
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at the request and with the participation of United States law en-
forcement authorities. The case involved an alleged drug trafficker,
a "kingpin" accused and subsequently convicted of complicity in the
torture-murder of Kiki Camareno, the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) agent whose death is still very much an issue in our law-
enforcement circles and whose murderers have not yet been brought
to justice. At the request of the DEA, which obtained a United States
arrest warrant, Mr. Verdugo was apprehended by the Mexican police
and delivered into United States hands. Our law recognizes jurisdiction
in such circumstances under the Ker-Frisbee doctrine, 9 although sub-
sequently the Mexican policemen were accused of kidnapping.
After Mr. Verdugo was in United States custody, the DEA sought
to obtain evidence from his Mexican residence. They approached the
proper Mexican authorities to conduct the search and seizure with
United States participation; that search was admittedly lawful under
Mexican law. The DEA did not, however, ask the United States court
with jurisdiction, before which Verdugo had been arraigned, for a
search-and-seizure warrant. When the prosecutor sought to introduce
the evidence obtained in the Mexican searches, the District Court
suppressed it, holding that the Fourth Amendment applied but had
not been satisfied, since no warrant had been issued and even if one
had been obtained, the manner in which the search and seizure was
carried out would have been unlawful. Admittedly, however, any
warrant issued by the Court would not have had effect in Mexico.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with a lengthy discussion of the
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution, essentially relying on the
doctrines enunciated by Reid v. Covert,I0 that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments apply to the prosecution of United States citizens overseas
by the United States Government, and by the INS v. Lopez-Mendoza"
case, which held that illegal aliens in the United States have rights
under the Fourth Amendment. By parity of reasoning, the Court said,
the Fourth Amendment must apply to search and seizure of an alien's
property overseas even where it was lawful under the applicable foreign
law. The Court noted that it would be odd indeed to acknowledge that
the respondent was entitled to trial-related rights under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments but not under the Fourth Amendment.
9 See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, reh'g
denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).
, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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The Supreme Court disagreed, however, six to three. The plurality
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to searches and seizures by United States agents of
property located abroad which are owned by a non-resident alien, even
when that alien is in United States custody facing criminal prosecution.
The Court noted that any Fourth Amendment violation occurred solely
in Mexico, at the time of the search and seizure; it distinguished Fourth
Amendment rights from those arising under the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, including their applicability to citizens as opposed to aliens; and
it noted that the Framers did not intend the Fourth Amendment to
apply abroad. Finally, the Court said that the rule adopted by the
Court of Appeals would apply not only to law enforcement operations
abroad, but also to other foreign policy operations which might result
in "searches and seizures" involving our national interest; any restric-
tions on such activities must be imposed by the political branches
through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation. There are
strong dissents from Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
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